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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume I

In 1986, plaintiff purchased property near Tillson Lake intending
to use the nearby lake for recreation. Plaintiff focused on the 1975
deed and covenants from which defendants acquired their lakefront
tract, and which required the defendants to "forever maintain and
keep full of water at the present water level" the waters of Tillson Lake.
The covenant was "to run with the land" and further provided that
should "the dam [controlling the lake] become damaged, destroyed or
in need of repairs, it shall be repaired... promptly so as to restore and
preserve the present level of the lake." Additionally, plaintiff asserted
that defendants conspired to drain the lake and deprive him of his
right to use the lake for recreational purposes. Finally, plaintiff alleged that the defendants were acting maliciously, punishing plaintiff
for his successful opposition to defendant's development plans around
the lake.
Defendants, in compliance with a Department of Environmental
Conservation directive to repair the dam, drained the lake to institute
necessary repairs. However, following repeated acts of vandalism resulting in illegal filling of the lake, defendants emptied the lake and
reapplied for the fill permit. Defendants then commenced a third
party action against the previous owners of plaintiff's land, alleging
that they "falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the lake
was full of water and would remain that way." The trial court dismissed
the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court affirmed.
The court held that the covenant upon which plaintiff based his
claim did not affect or benefit plaintiff's chain of title. Furthermore,
the court found that no portion of the lakeside tract was near plaintiffs parcel. Thus, plaintiffs deed contained no water rights or covenants concerning the water level of the lake.
Kedrin Hanscum

SOUTH DAKOTA
Steiner v. County of Marshall, 568 N.W.2d 627 (S.D. 1997) (holding
that a prescriptive easement against excessive water will not begin to
accrue until downstream water users suffer damage from water).
Four upstream landowners ("Landowners") sought to enjoin the
County of Marshall ("County") from obstructing the flow of water under Fort Road. Originally, the road was built with a seventy-two inch
culvert. In 1961, the road was raised eight feet and a thirty-six inch
culvert replaced the seventy-inch culvert. The road was located near
Cattail Lake, which remained dry until 1994 when unusual precipitation caused the lake to fill. As a result, the road began to act as a dam.
In 1995, flooding occurred upstream of Fort Road. The Landowners
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filed a complaint against the County and an association of downstream
landowners ("Association") intervened, claiming their prescriptive
easement precluded the County from installing another culvert which
would threaten their land.
On the date of trial, the Landowners and the County agreed on a
consent judgment. The Association appealed the lower court's holding which accepted the Landowners and the County's consent judgment. The consent judgment provided that the Landowners would release the County from any liability and, in return, the County would
install another sixty-inch culvert in the road, as well as monitor water
levels that would flow through the culverts.
The court held that one party - whether an original party, a party
joined later, or an intervenor - could not stop other parties from setfling their own disputes. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to present evidence and have its objection heard at a hearing on whether to
approve a consent judgment, the party does not have the power to
block a decree by withholding its consent.
Further, the court held as a matter of law that any prescriptive
easement the Association might have would not begin to accrue until
there was damage. Downstream land would have to sustain flood
damage before the Association could impose a prescriptive easement
on the Landowners. Since downstream land had not sustained any
flood damage, the lower court properly dismissed the Association's
claim.
The Association also asserted that the lower court erred when it
dismissed its claims as a matter of law, arguing that they were entitled
to a trial on whether injunctive relief should be granted. The court
held that the Association's only basis for an injunction was their claim
regarding a prescriptive easement and since this cause of action was
invalid, the Association had no basis on which to grant injunctive relief.
Loretta L. Schouten

WASHINGTON
Okanogan Wilderness League v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732 (Wash.
1997) (holding that nonuse of a water right for nearly fifty years raised
a presumption of abandonment, and that municipality was not statutorily exempt).
In 1912, the Town of Twisp acquired a water right with the intent
to divert 10 cubic feet per second ("cfs") from the Twisp River. Twisp
perfected the right by diverting water. In 1927, Twisp sought approval
from the state to change the point of diversion on the Twisp River. In

